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Abstract 
Beyond the elementary results produc巴dby the finite combination of primitiv巴 procedurespromised in 
the original construction of an objectivism， ifw巴 tryto extend them w巴mustinevitably use the method of 
abstraction. The co口ceptswhich are abstracted but are not y巴tconvincingly accepted， are said to be super-
objectivist. Some of these concepts may reasonably b巴accept巴dand incorporated with the construction， though 
sometimes may possibly cause a revision of the system. Som巴conceptscurrent in the classical lectures may 
there呂ft巴rturn out to be 1巴gardedas nonsensical 
o. Introduction 
In the late current of developing the mathematical logic， has been raised 
the metalanguage， which has partly fostered a world of concepts and statements 
to be left uncertain over the practical realm， apparently concocting a sort of 五ctlve
awareness， which might be called pseudo-awareness'. That some authors in this 
line use the word ‘crisis'. seems to suggest their actual feeling of apprehensions 
for the direct connection with the pseudo-awareness. This paper is intended to 
clear up these dubious conceptions and to obtain a totally pellucid aspect of 
a羽rareness
In an objectivism (or an objectivist theory)， ifan event a fulfils a qualification 
(or a specifying property) S， then we write 
aCS， 
and the locus 
C(S)二 {sls亡S}
is admitted as a (determinate) set of events if and only if the following con-
ditions are satidfied 
(1) S is given by a precise description (or a precise formulation) ; 
本紀園谷芳雄
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(2) there previously is given a (determinate) universal set of events (or 
a universe) U and C( 5) is destined to be contained in U; 
(3) Vaξ U: aCS. v.α仁tS.
日1hen(3) is satisfied， 5 is said to be descr砂tive.If al of (1)， (2) and (3) are 
satisfied， U iscalled the levelof S. Even when 5 is not found descriptive， C( 5) 
may yet be called a class in the current usage. If the condition (1) is admitted， 
we shall take C( 5) as an assembly， whether 5 is descriptive or not. 
In an objectivism the primitive universe is very essential and ‘observation' 
is taken to be developed over the events concretely defined on the universe. As 
the observation advances， itwil possibly be elevated toward the objects of higher 
level therefrom defined. The total construction made up by the axioms， definitions 
and the results therefrom attained is the ρroto-coηstruction1)(of the intended objec 
tivism)， which shall possibly be revised in the future if needed. Sets， classes and 
assemblies suggestsd in the proto-construction wil naturally build up a set theory 
which is called the annexed set theory2) (to the intended objectivism). Propositions 
composed and announced in the annexed set theory wil inversely be interpreted 
into propositions in the pr叫o-construction.However， these interpreted propositions 
may not always present significant contents 
If a concept put forward in reference to the proto-construction cannot 
candidly be considered to promise a content convincingly determinate， then it is 
called a super-objectivist conce戸tor a super-concept， and the conception of such 
one is taken as a super-objectivist conceJりがon.If a super-concept is proved to give 
no objection， inapplication， to the proto-construction， then it may be additionally 
incorporated into the proto-construction as an objectivist result. 
1. Source of Recognition 
The term 'jinitary' proposed by D. Hilbert has， by most authors， been intro 
duced simply to mean 'intuitively convincing'. However， for instance， by G. T. 
Kneebone， what Hilbert explained when he firstly introduced this word is inter司
preted as follows3) : We shall always use the word 'finitary' to indicate that the 
discussion， assertion， ordefinition in question is kept within the bounds of through 
going producibility of objects and through-going practibility of processes， and 
may accordingly be carried out within the domain of concrete inspection 
The word 'intuition' may possibly cause a world of unavailing difficulties if 
we work with it in the general seηse used in philosophy. This word may not be 
( 2 ) 
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explained out but dialectically， and its action may be put in rational inspection 
(under rational restrictions) only in connoction with the intellectual awareness. It 
may not be denied that eve日 amere delusion has its composition to be caused 
thr'ough the action of ‘intuition'， while its falsity is revealed only when it is related 
to the intellectual awareness. Conversely， the intellectual awareness cannot be 
separated from ‘intuition'. For instance， natural integers， volumes， and sizes are al 
considered as possible concepts based on the facts intuitively convincing. 
Hilbert's‘concrete inspection' may be regarded to be possible only in that the 
intended formal system has a concrete model. Thus an accumulation of estimated 
results cannot produce but a pseudo-awareness unless a formal system is proved 
to have a model containing these results. However， i日 anobjectivism， its sub 
stantial model is precedently given， sothat the pseudo-awareness may be precluded 
An assembly， as an object merely abstracted from the annexed set theory， 
may not be but a pseudo-concept (i.e. a super -concept) unless it proves to corre 
spond to a (determinate) set of events in the proto-construction. When a super 
concept can be regarded to be an additional concept as an objectivist result， itis 
that the concept is admitted at least to be manupulatively41 convincing in refer 
ence to the proto-construction. Such a concept may possibly be said to be intu-
itively convincing， that is， to gibe a finitary one. On the other side， itis asserted， 
in the empricist pragmatism5~ that a mere abstract object must be renounced 
unless any way is found to accept it as a日 objectivistresult. However， ifno ob-
jection is found against the propriety of the object in question but mere sceptic 
one which has no rudiment in the proto-construction， then the object may be con-
sidered as manipulatively convincing and be accepted. 
2. Benefit of the Super-objectivist Conception 
For example， the content of the assumption“there ca日bebut a finite number 
of prime numbers"， which Euclid posited as a hypothetical premise， was but super 
objectivist， and from this was concluded a constraction， so that it was convinced 
that there must be infinitely ma日yprime numbers. All members involved in this 
argument could be found within the proto-construction which Euclid had had， except 
the above-mentioned hypothetical premise. Thus there was left no way but re 
nounce the premise， to avoid the contradiction. Such a decision is the key of a 
‘reduction to absurdity'， and it is notable that， inthis sort of argument， renouncible 
premise is always supplied through super-objectivist conception 
( 3) 
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A substantially objectivist concept should， in actual practice， designate an 
objectivist set of events. However， the set thereby designated must necessarily 
be but a finite set. Thus the conception of an infinite set is essentially super-
objectivist. But， ifan infinite set is， inany way， convinced to be undeniable， then 
it may be incorporated with the proto-construction as an objectivist result (with 
epistemologically sufficient explanation) 
In acception of the concept of Q the initial number (or the cardinal) of the 3rd 
class， following two facts are necessarily accompanied : 
(i) the class or the ordinal numbers of the 2nd class makes up a well-ordered 
set， which must be admitted as determinate if to be accepted ; 
(i) Q cannot be the limit of an enumerable sequence of sections of it. 
Both (i) and (i) are， atthis stage， may not be considered but give super-objectivist 
conceptions. Because of the historical property of the ordering process， itseems 
rather impertinent to regard Q exactly to be a determinate class. The condition 
(i) apparently prevents us from attaining Q by means of an enumerable stepping 
which is considered， in an objectivism， to be the only way to reach an infinite 
set as a limiting destination. 
As an example of an assembly of the type Q， we have the family of Borel 
sets， but there has not yet been discovered any determinate example of the type 
Q in the domain of real numbers.* 
The concept ofωthe initial number of enumerable infinity may not be con-
sidered to be so easy a one， either. In effect every remainder of this aggregate 
has the same size with the original body. However， this aggregate is considered 
to provide the primitive model of the human process of numeration (i.e.， the natural 
numeration). So， ifrenounce this， mathematical devices wil extremely be limited. 
Being pushed out to the stage not bounded by any finite integer， we have decided 
to take it up in the meaning that the (n+ l)th element is determined when the 
nth is given. This may be taken as an objectivist result in methodology. 
Given a set M， ifthere is found a sequence of disjoint subsets Mk(kニ1，2，…)
such that 
( ¥(xEM)(ヨk)(xEMk)
is p"roved， then the family (M k)(kニ1，2，…)is a partition of M， so that M is 
* ) Thisview is made in that we should not admit any oracle which produces the answers only by 'historical option' 
( 4) 
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considered as the union of ( M k) and is written as 
M=UMk・
However， inour objectivism， M is not said to be the sum of (M k)but for the 
assurance that the size (adequately defined) of the remainder 
??? ??
tends to zero as n tends to∞. 
Le us observe the assembly C of real-valued functions which are defined in 
the interval [0， 1]and are continuous there. Let an enumerable set {Xl， X2， .・) 
(c [0，1]) be everywhere dense in [0， 1]. Then， for any two functions f and g 
from C， if
Vk=1，2，…: f(れ)=g(ね)
we have， as well-known， that 
VxE[O，l] :f(x)=g(x). 
So the elements f of C correspond one-to-one with the sequences (of real 
numbers) 
(f(Xl)， f(X2)，…) • (2. 1) 
Thus， ifwe want to admit C to be a set， the only objection which we may tossi 
bly meet will be that the sequence (2. 1) may not be considered as a determinate 
element (because it might rather be a super-objectivist concept). Neverthless， 
if we renounce this objection， we may regard C to be a set. 
Now we take up the assembly V of propositions whose validities in reference 
to the proto同constructionhave been or will possibly in the future be proved. In 
this case， since the assembly V is the class caused by provability， itappears as if 
only one super-objectivist conception (i.e.， the provability in the future) is involved. 
But， on thinking over the matters， we fi日dit is not so simple. In effect， the ways 
of proof are generally not so simple as arithmetic operations， but may possibly 
need some assumptions which are originally super-objectivist. In addition， ifsome 
trial of proving a proposition comes across undecidable elements， the proto-
construction itself must possibly be changed out. If then， at least some proposi-
tions will have their validities to be promised only by the proofs in terms of the 
new constructIon. 
( 5) 
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If the above assembly V istaken up primarily with the intention of examining 
the dominating extent of the present proto-construction， then the revised con 
struction may not worth notice. So then， propositions to be proved in the new 
construction may make only a redundant part for the examination. However， if
this part is omitted， the intended objectivism wil lose its sense that it must pro 
ceed its developing through the revision of the proto-construction if needed. 
3. Hypothetical Scheme of U niversal Assemblies 
Let U 1 be the class of events which can be produced by a finite number of 
elementary operations (given in the intended objectivism) from the primitive uniω 
verse Uo， and U z be the class of events which can finitely be produced in terms 
of the language promised on Ul， and so on. Then， through the iteration of the 
definition， we have a sequence of assemblies 
Uo， Ul， Uz，…. (3. 1) 
If these assemblies are admitted as objectivist results， they are considered to give 
universes. Thus， inthis sense， we have a hierarchy of universes by (3. 1). 
If P is a proposition produced by combination of a finite number of operations 
and terms involved in the language promised on Uo， then there wil be assumed 
an assembly E( P) of events such that 
E(P)~ UoU Ul， 
0日thequestion if 
(VaEE(P)1 aCP)A(a$.E(P). =争.actp) (3. 2) 
is verified or not. If E(P) is existent as a (determinate) set fulfiling (3. 2)， then 
P is an objectivistρroβosition. However， what we should at the primary stage in-
qUlre lS“what event a isto be examined on the relation 
αcP 
?". The assembly L(P) of such a's is called the level 01 P 
If L (P) is either proved to be a set or admitted to be regarded as on ob-
jectivist result， then P is called a general propωitioη(in the intended objectivism). 
If a general proposition P fulfils the condition 
???
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VaE三L(P): aCP. V. actp (3. 3) 
(hence ~(aCP. .^ a江P))，then P is an objectivist(or desc門戸tive)βro戸osition.
L (P) may apparently be regarded as a universe， and it is clear that 
L(P)C UIU Uo・
Yet we may not always have 
L(P)ニ Uo.V. L(P)ニ Ul・
We thus see that the construction of Ul may not be so simple. Incidentally， when 
(3. 3) does not hold， itmust be that there exists at least one event aEL(P) for 
which whether aCP or not is undecidable. In this case P is an undecidableρro-
ρosztzoη. 
4. Incompleteness 
The proposition (in the theory of numbers)“there exist infinitely many pairs 
of twinprime numbers" must， independently of the human speculation， be either 
true or otherwise false. A proposition which must， like this example， be absolutely 
and univalently destined to be true or otherwise false is called a solidρroJうosition
If a theory based on certain axiomatics cannot clearify the truth value of at least 
one solid proposition ocurring in it， itis said to be incomplete. 
If any of the proposition Q or its negation ~ Q can be added to the axioms 
without violating the consistency， then Q is an undecidable pro戸ositionfor the 
original theory. Therefore， ifa proposition Q is undecidable， Q can neither be 
true nor false， so that it may not be solid 
The assembly V of valid* propositions (*: i.e.， provable of its truth) referred 
to the proto-construction may contain not only the actually known valid propo-
sitions， but also ones which wil possibly in the future turn out to be valid. So， 
V is essentially a super-concept， whereas， ifVo is the total collection of the actu-
aly known valid propositions， Vo isat most a (determinate) finite set. 
To tel the truth， the content of the assembly V -Vo isal but nonsensical， 
If a proposition Q is certainly such that 
QE V-Vo， (4. 1) 
then Q must turn out actually to be valid through the proof ascertaining (4. 1)， 
( 7 ) 
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so that it must be that Q E Vo. This being so， V may not be regarded as an ob 
jectivist result， but rather be regarded to be a mere abstract object as a historical 
extension of Vo・Similarly，the same thing may be concluded about the assembly 
of invalid propositions. 
In an objectivism， valid propositions and invalid ones may both be regarded 
as solid. Hence， that a proposition Q cannot be solid must mean that Q is unde 
cidable， ifnot renounced. Since 'validity' is now considered as a historical concept， 
the essential problem left in here is of undecidability 
Incompleteness and inconsistency (of an objectivism) do not essentially in 
teract each other. The problem of inconsistency cannot be thought so essential. 
If an objectivism is factually found inconsistent， itmust be caused by some human 
carelessness on selecting the axioms or the definitions 
A solid proposition which is left unsolved may be considered important for 
the intention to discover an evidence of incompleteness of the proto-construction. 
However， even though it is certainly unsolvable in the proto-construction， itmay 
possibly turn out to be solvable in a revised construction in the future. Thus， the 
problem of incompleteness may not be more than a historical pending one. In ef. 
fect， ifwe take the example of the twinprime numbers， we may not say“no preClse 
solution can be expected now on through". 
In conclusion it shall be noted that an objectivism may be proceeded along 
a smooth developing course except for the following treatments 
(i) if we come across a contradiction， we eliminate it by adequate revision 
of the axioms or the definitions 
(i) if a proposition P which cannot be laid aside unsettled is found unde-
cidable， then we add to the construction either P or ~ P as a口axiomto 
settle the construction. 
These treatments appear to be not only very artificial but rather optional policies 
If we yet are to research for any rudiment justifying them， itmay not be done in 
other place than epistemology. On the like stand the treatment of super-objectivist 
subjects should generally be deeply associated with epistemology. 
If a proposition Q isproved to be undecidable， either Q or ~ Q is to be added 
to the proto-construction as an axiom， so that Q is turned out to be a solid propo 
sition in the new construction. Thus the solidity of a proposition may be considered 
to be a historical concept relative to the improvement of the construction. How-
ever， the discourse may emphatically be thought to produce a branch after the 
addition of the new axiom， and the part prior to the addition may be taken as the 
( 8) 
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proper part of the intended objectivism. If the construction revised by the ad-
dition of Q is found to be inconsistent， then it may be concluded that Q is， in fact， 
not an undecidable proposition at al， on the proper part. 
Mathematical Seminar 01 the Murora叩 Inst.Tch. Hokkaido 
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